【MBA中国网讯】Leader-Based Collective Bargaining: Cooperation Mechanism and Incentive Analysis

“领头羊”采购联盟谈判：

机制设计与动因分析

讲座时间：10月10日上午10:00-12:00

讲座地点：25教学楼A区3A教室

主讲人：牛保庄

主讲人简介：

华南理工大学教授、博士生导师。教育部“青年长江学者”，国家自科基金委"优青"，广东省“青年珠江学者”，广东省政协委员。研究方向为竞争与合作博弈，制造业跨境供应链运营。目前已在物流供应链领域发表国际公认的顶级期刊论文8篇，包括MSOM 1篇，POM 4篇，TRB 3篇，另有24篇文章发表在EJOR, Omega, Risk Analysis等知名期刊。MSOM, POM, TRB等20余种重要期刊审稿人。获广东省哲学社会科学优秀成果二等奖(排名第1)，中国决策科学"青年科技奖"等奖项。

讲座内容：

We study leader-based collective bargaining (LCB), under which a leading buyer (leader) and a following buyer (follower) form an alliance to jointly purchase a common component from a supplier. Although the leader and the follower cooperate in their component purchase, they compete in selling their end products. We first analyze the most common and simple form of LCB, equal price LCB, under which the follower pays to the leader the same wholesale price that the leader obtains from his negotiation with the supplier. We compare each buyer's profit under the equal price LCB with the benchmark where each buyer purchases separately from the supplier. We find that although the alliance might obtain a lower wholesale price and although the leader is always better off under equal price LCB, the follower can be worse off if the competition intensity of the leader's and follower's products is within an intermediate region.